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1 Introduction and motivation
This paper deals with the analysis of, say, weekly observed store-level scanner data,
with the purpose of linking market shares with marketing instruments like price and
promotion. A typical format of such analysis is a regression type model, which, in
the case of market shares, is often a market share attraction model, see Cooper and
Nakanishi (1988) and Cooper (1993) for detailed early treatments and Fok, Franses
and Paap (2002) for a recent review of its econometric properties. Such an attraction
model delivers, amongst other things, estimates of own and cross price elasticities,
which in turn can be used to draw inference on the competitive structure. With
these elasticities, one can infer, for example, what might happen to the own brand
market share if the own price is lowered or when competitors lower their prices.
Market share models are useful to sketch competitive structures. However, there
is one thing these models cannot do, and that is, to help to understand which brands
lose share to which brands. To make this statement more precise, think about the
following situation. There are two brands, A and B, and we observe weekly sales of
these brands. Suppose for the moment that the same number of households visits
the store in each week. If the price of, say, A is lowered in a certain week, we might
observe more sales of A and less of B. This information might be useful to see if
lower prices generate more sales, but it is insufficient to understand whether the
change in sales of A can be fully attributed to households who change from B to A,
or whether some buyers of A have also switched to B. Hence, the question where
the new sales come from cannot be addressed by simply looking at weekly sales or
at shares data.
Alternatively, one might turn to a micro analysis using household scanner panel
data to get insight into brand-switching. These micro data are more detailed than
macro store-level data, but for household scanner panel data there are some problems
too. One of these is the availability, that is, scanner panel data are relatively scarce,
and it is often expensive to acquire them. A second problem is the representativeness
of these data, which depends on the size of the panel and on the way participating
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households have been selected. Moreover, even if a household panel is representative,
the effective sample which is eventually considered in the analysis might not be
representative, as it is often necessary to exclude households. A reason for exclusion
might be that households do not make enough purchases during a specific time
period, see for example Bucklin and Lattin (1991) and Guadagni and Little (1983).
The representativeness issue for household scanner panel data is addressed by Gupta,
Chintagunta, Kaul and Wittink (1996). Russell and Kamakura (1994) propose an
integrated approach which takes advantage of both the information richness of micro
data and the representativeness of macro data. However, their approach does not
avoid the availability of scanner panel data.
The aim of this paper is therefore to develop a method to infer share-switching
from widely available store-level scanner data. Share-switching is related to aggre-
gated market shares in a similar fashion as brand-switching is related to individual
brand choice behavior. Our model can be used to construct share-switching maps,
which are useful to get a better understanding of the competitive structure. For
example, consider again two brands A and B. It might happen that the cross price
elasticities suggest that A and B are not strong price competitors, while at the
same time much switching does occur between these two brands. In that case, com-
petition between A and B might be due to low customer loyalty for both brands.
An explanation for such a competition is that households might behave as variety-
seekers, that is, households might derive utility from brand-switching itself, besides
the utility resulting from the selected brand. McAlister and Pessemier (1982) pro-
vide a classification scheme of the variety-seeking literature. In this case, increasing
customer loyalty should be more important than pricing strategies.
A second contribution of our model is that it allows for a decomposition of own
and cross price elasticities. For example, a decrease of the own price is likely to result
in an increase of the own market share. This increased market share is a result of
(i) retaining more of the own share (less switching away from the own brand) and
(ii) gaining additional share from the other brands (more switching towards the
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own brand). The decomposition from our model makes it possible to quantify these
partial effects. This is an additional insight which cannot be obtained from market
share attraction models.
The structure of our paper is as follows. In Section 2, we outline in a little
more detail the situation, which was already briefly touched upon above, concerning
weekly sales of brands and week-to-week share-switching. Next, in Section 3, we put
forward our model, and in Section 4, we explain how the model can be used to get
insight into the competitive structure. In Section 5, we discuss parameter estimation.
In Section 6, we apply our method to four store-level data sets concerning two
product categories, each having four brands. Finally, in Section 7, we conclude with
a discussion of the implications of our method.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
2 On store-level data and share-switching
Consider the case where we have weekly store-level scanner data, for t = 1, . . . , T .
For the moment, we assume that T = 2. Figure 1 sketches a possible situation
involving the market shares of three brands A, B and C. At t = 1 the three brands
have shares of 30%, 50% and 20%, while the shares at t = 2 are given by 36%,
38% and 26%, respectively. These observed changes in market share from t = 1 to
t = 2 are the result of unobserved share-switching from and to each of the three
brands, which is represented by the arrows. The numbers on the arrows indicate
which fraction of the market share at t = 1 is transferred. So, in the left panel
of the figure, brand A retains 80% of its market share, it loses 10% of its share to
brand B, and it loses another 10% to brand C. Similarly, brand B retains 70% of its
share, and it loses 20% and 10% to brand A and brand C, respectively. It is further
seen that brand C retains 90% of its share, whereas the remaining 10% moves to
brand A. It is easily checked that these switching fractions indeed give the market
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shares at time t = 2. For example, at t = 2 brand A has a share of 36%, which is
0.80× 30% + 0.20× 50% + 0.10× 20%.
However, these share-switching fractions do not uniquely determine the market
shares at t = 2, and the right panel gives another set of share-switching fractions
resulting in the same shares. The issue is that there are only three observations
(three market shares at t = 2), whereas there are six free parameters to be estimated
(nine switching arrows of which three are restricted such that outgoing arrows sum
to unity). So, more than two periods have to be considered.
Figure 2 illustrates share-switching when T = 4 weeks are considered. The share-
switching arrows between t = 1 and t = 2 are assumed to be the same as the share-
switching arrows between t = 2 and t = 3 and those between t = 3 and t = 4, so that
the number of free parameters is still six. In principle, the number of market share
observations is now sufficient to estimate the values of the share-switching arrows.
We note that the share-switching fractions can be correlated to marketing actions
through time-invariant response parameters. For example, if a brand decreases its
price, this might induce additional switching towards this brand. Clearly, if the
switching fractions are correlated with time-varying marketing variables, they are
not time-invariant anymore.
3 The model
In this section we develop our share-switching model. To this end, we define the
market share of brand j at time t by Mj,t, j = 1, . . . , J , t = 1, . . . , T . Furthermore,
we define the fraction of the market share Ml,t−1 of brand l moving to brand k at
time t by λl,k,t. It is convenient to collect the market shares observed at time t in
the vector Mt = (M1,t, . . . ,MJ,t)
′ and to collect the share-switching fractions at time
t in the matrix
Λt =


λ1,1,t · · · λ1,J,t
...
. . .
...
λJ,1,t · · · λJ,J,t

.
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For example, in the left panel of Figure 1 we would have
Mt−1 =


0.30
0.50
0.20

, Mt =


0.36
0.38
0.26

, Λt =


0.80 0.10 0.10
0.20 0.70 0.10
0.10 0 0.90

.
The share-switching fractions as contained in Λt satisfy two conditions. First,
these share-switching fractions just redistribute each brand’s market share, so that
they have to sum to one for each given brand, that is,
J∑
k=1
λl,k,t = 1, l = 1, . . . , J, (1)
or in matrix notation,
Λt ιJ = ιJ , (2)
where ιJ denotes the J × 1 vector consisting of ones. Second, by definition, the
current market share of each brand is the sum of the portions carried over to that
brand from each brand’s previous market share. This leads to the Markov equation
Mk,t =
J∑
l=1
λl,k,tMl,t−1, k = 1, . . . , J, (3)
which is also the key equation in the aggregated Markov model of Leeflang (1974),
see also Leeflang et al. (2000). In matrix notation, it is given by
Mt = Λ
′
tMt−1. (4)
In Appendix A we outline the model of Leeflang (1974) and how it fundamentally
differs from ours in various respects.
We have already mentioned that the share-switching fractions λl,k,t might be
correlated to marketing activity. However, even if such observable variables are
included, it cannot not be expected that share-switching is fully explained. In order
to account for this, we decompose the share-switching matrix Λt into a deterministic
component Λ˜t and a random component Et, that is,
Λt = Λ˜t + Et, (5)
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where
Λ˜t =


λ˜1,1,t · · · λ˜1,J,t
...
. . .
...
λ˜J,1,t · · · λ˜J,J,t

, Et =


e1,1,t · · · e1,J,t
...
. . .
...
eJ,1,t · · · eJ,J,t

.
All elements of the error matrix Et are assumed to have expectation zero, so that
the expectation of the share-switching matrix Λt is Λ˜t. Substituting (5) into (4)
gives
Mt = Λ˜
′
tMt−1 + E
′
tMt−1, (6)
decomposing market shares into an explained and an unexplained component. This
constitutes the first part of our model.
In order to interpret the elements of Λ˜t (which have to be estimated using actual
data) as share-switching fractions, we require that the “redistribution condition” is
maintained, that is,
Λ˜t ιJ = ιJ . (7)
By postmultiplying both sides of (5) by ιJ and substituting (2) and (7), it follows
that the rows of the error matrix Et have to sum to zero, that is,
Et ιJ = 0, (8)
or
J∑
k=1
el,k,t = 0, l = 1, . . . , J. (9)
Next, by transposing (6), postmultiplying both sides by ιJ , and incorporating the
conditions (7) and (8), it follows that
M ′t ιJ = M
′
t−1Λ˜t ιJ + M
′
t−1Et ιJ
⇔ M ′t ιJ = M
′
t−1 ιJ + M
′
t−1 0
⇔ 1 = 1 + 0. (10)
So, both the observed market shares Mt = Λ
′
tMt−1 and the predicted market shares
Λ˜′tMt−1 sum to unity, which is an important feature of a model for market shares.
Furthermore, it follows from (10) that one of the J market share equations in (6) is
redundant, so that only the parameters of J − 1 equations have to be estimated.
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In order to complete the model, we specify the elements of Λ˜t and we assume a
distribution for the elements of the error matrix Et. We define the elements of Λ˜t
by
λ˜l,k,t =
exp(αl,k + x
′
k,tβ)∑J
j=1 exp(αl,j + x
′
j,tβ)
, l = 1, . . . , J, k = 1, . . . , J, (11)
so that the redistribution condition (7) is indeed satisfied. Similar to the conditional
logit model of McFadden (1974), not all intercept parameters αl,k are identified. For
identification purposes, we set αl,J = 0, l = 1, . . . J . These parameters correspond
to the redundant J-th market share equation. It is seen from (11) that each share-
switching fraction λ˜l,k,t from brand l to brand k has its own intercept with parameter
αl,k, and that λ˜l,k,t depends on the marketing-mix variables of the receiving brand
k through the shared response parameters β. We note that it is not affected by
the marketing-mix of the supplying brand l. This is consistent with the brand-
switching models of Givon (1984) and Seetharaman and Chintagunta (1998) which
aim to describe variety-seeking behavior and habit persistence in brand choice. The
marketing-mix variables in xk,t are in first-differences, as share-switching corresponds
to changes in market shares, rather than absolute market share levels. We emphasize
that, as in the conditional logit model, the estimation results of our share-switching
model are invariant with respect to which brand is taken as the base brand J .
For the share-switching errors el,k,t, we would want to consider a distribution
which is, on one hand, parsimonious in its parameterization, and which, on the
other hand, is flexible enough to reflect uncertainty patterns in share-switching.
Hence, we assume that the el,k,t are distributed independently as N(0, σ
2
k,t) with
σ2k,t = σ
2Mγk,t−1, where σ
2 and γ have to be estimated. So, the share-switching
errors obey a normal distribution, and they are allowed to be heteroscedastic in the
sense that the variance might depend on the market share of the receiving brand k.
In fact, we expect that γ > 0, as it entails that if the receiving brand has a small
market share, it is probably able to take over only relatively small fractions of the
other market shares, and hence uncertainty shall be limited. On the other hand,
anything can happen when the receiving brand is a powerful brand with a large
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market share.
In Appendix B we show that if the elements el,k,t of Et are independently
N(0, σ2Mγk,t−1) distributed before imposing the error summation restrictions (9),
the restriction in (9) implies that our final model reads as
M˜t =


M1,t
...
MJ−1,t

 ∼ N( µt, σ
2Vt ), (12)
where
µt =


∑J
l=1 λ˜l,1,tMl,t−1
...
∑J
l=1 λ˜l,J−1,tMl,t−1

 , (13)
and
Vt =
J∑
l=1
M2l,t−1

−
1∑J
j=1 M
γ
j,t−1


Mγ1,t−1
...
MγJ−1,t−1


(
Mγ1,t−1 · · ·M
γ
J−1,t−1
)
+ diag
(
Mγ1,t−1, . . . ,M
γ
J−1,t−1
)

 .
(14)
It is seen from (14) that the restriction in (9) induces that the market shares are
negatively correlated. This is a desirable feature, as, by definition, a larger market
share for one brand results in a smaller total market share for all other brands.
4 Interpretation
In this section we discuss how our share-switching model can be used to get insight
into the competitive structure. The well-known market share attraction model is
often used to compute own and cross price elasticities which indicate how the own
brand market share reacts to a small price decrease of the own brand or a compet-
itive brand. Our model can be used to obtain such elasticities as well. In order
to derive the elasticities, we first introduce some additional notation. We recall
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that λ˜l,k,t is interpreted as the fraction of the share of brand l moving to brand
k at time t. So, λ˜l,k,t corresponds to share-switching conditional on the supply-
ing brand l, that is, the share-switching fractions away from l sum to unity, or
∑J
k=1 λ˜l,k,t = 1. As an additional measure, we define the share-switching portion
λ¯l,k,t = Ml,t−1λ˜l,k,t, which relates switching from brand l to brand k to the total
market. Clearly,
∑J
l=1
∑J
k=1 λ¯l,k,t = 1. The share-switching portion λ¯l,k,t is an un-
conditional measure, which is in contrast with the share-switching fraction λ˜l,k,t.
We define the share-switching price elasticity δl→k,j,t as
δl→k,j,t =
∂λ¯l,k,t
∂pj,t
pj,t
λ¯l,k,t
=
∂λ˜l,k,t
∂pj,t
pj,t
λ˜l,k,t
, (15)
where pj,t denotes the price of brand j at time t. The interpretation of (15) is that
a one percent price increase of brand j at time t results in δl→k,j,t percent additional
share-switching from brand l to brand k. We note that δl→k,j,t is not necessarily zero
if j 6= l, k, that is, when the price adjustment concerns a brand different from the
two brands l and k for which share-switching is considered. For example, if brand
j lowers its price, it might gain some share from brand l which would have gone
to brand k otherwise. The brand-switching mechanisms, underlying the aggregate
response of share-switching to price adjustments, are discussed below.
Basically, if k 6= l, brand j might take over some variety-seeking customers of
brand l which would otherwise have chosen to switch to brand k, as brand j becomes
more attractive relative to brand k with its price being unaltered. This idea is in
accordance with the brand-switching model of Seetharaman and Chintagunta (1998)
which assumes that variety-seekers select the brand which maximizes their utility
after excluding the previously purchased brand from consideration. Furthermore,
households switching to brand j might also be pure utility maximizers, which is the
second group identified in the model of Seetharaman and Chintagunta (1998). In
the alternative case that k = l, δl→k,j,t measures the effectiveness of a price reduction
of brand j to take over customers which would otherwise have stayed with brand l.
Such switching customers are neither involved in variety-seeking (they are willing
to buy brand l again) nor habit persistence (they are willing to switch). Note that
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other households might also feature habit persistence, that is, they might stick to
brand l and this choice is not affected by the price reduction of brand j. These
households form the third and most important group in the model of Seetharaman
and Chintagunta (1998). The presence of this group decreases the aggregate effect
of a competitive price reduction.
If price is one of the marketing-mix variables included in (11), with response
parameter βp, then it can be shown that
δl→k,j,t =


βp pk,t (1− λ˜l,k,t) if k = j
−βp pj,t λ˜l,j,t if k 6= j
. (16)
These share-switching price elasticities resemble the price elasticities for the condi-
tional logit model. We note that, although prices are considered in first-differences
in (11), pj,t in (15) and (16) is defined as the absolute price.
The share-switching price elasticities, derived above, determine the reaction of
market shares to price changes, as market shares are eventually the result of share-
switching. For our model, it can be shown that the elasticity of the expected market
share E(Mk,t) =
∑J
l=1 λ¯l,k,t with respect to the price pj,t is given by
δk,j,t =
∂E(Mk,t)
∂pj,t
pj,t
E(Mk,t)
=
∑J
l=1 λ¯l,k,t δl→k,j,t∑J
i=1 λ¯i,k,t
. (17)
This market-share price elasticity can also be written as
δk,j,t =
J∑
l=1
ηl→k,j,t with ηl→k,j,t =
λ¯l,k,t∑J
i=1 λ¯i,k,t
δl→k,j,t, (18)
where ηl→k,j,t is the contribution of share-switching from brand l to brand k in
the overall effect of a price adjustment of brand j on the market share of brand
k. So, (18) provides a decomposition of the reaction of market share into compo-
nents attributable to changes in share-switching from each of the brands towards
the brand whose market share is affected. This decomposition provides interesting
insights, which cannot be obtained from market share attraction models. For ex-
ample, a decrease of the own price can be expected to result in an increased market
share by (i) retaining a larger part of the own current share (own customers have
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a smaller incentive to switch away) and (ii) taking over additional share from com-
peting brands (customers of competing brands have a larger incentive to switch).
The part of the increased market share attributable to retaining more of the own
share is ηk→k,j,t/δk,j,t with j = k, whereas the part attributable to gaining more of
the competitive share is given by 1− (ηk→k,j,t/δk,j,t). In other words, the decompo-
sition can give insight into which part of the reaction of the own market share to
an own price reduction is caused by increased customer retention, and which part is
not. We note that each component ηl→k,j,t in the decomposition (18) consists of the
share-switching price elasticity δl→k,j,t multiplied by a weight proportional to the cor-
responding share-switching portion λ¯l,k,t. So, contributions are determined by both
the price-sensitivity and the relative magnitude of corresponding share-switching.
The price elasticities defined by (17) amount to a generalization of a result es-
tablished by Bucklin, Russell and Srinivasan (1998). This result is a relationship
between price elasticities and aggregate brand-switching, which has been derived on
the basis of the conditional logit model. Basically, it states that1
δk,j,t =


βp pk,t (1− λ˜k,k,t) if k = j
−βp pj,t λ˜k,j,t if k 6= j
, (19)
which, using (16), boils down to
δk,j,t = δk→k,j,t. (20)
So, in terms of our model, this relationship states that the reaction of market share
on a price adjustment is only caused by the effect on customer retention, and not by
the effect on share-switching from competing brands. This is more restrictive than
our price elasticity specification.
Our model gives insights into the effects of price adjustments on share-switching
and market shares. Furthermore, the model can also be used to infer the magnitude
of share-switching across brands. In order to fully understand the price elasticity
and share-switching patterns, it is useful to visualize them in two-dimensional maps.
1Bucklin, Russell and Srinivasan (1998) actually consider the logarithm of price in the condi-
tional logit model, so that the price term disappears in their result.
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A competitive map for price elasticities can be constructed as described in Cooper
(1988, 1993). Complementary, a share-switching map can be constructed using the
multidimensional unfolding technique of Constantine and Gower (1978) or using
the multidimensional scaling methodology of DeSarbo and Manrai (1992). In the
empirical section we discuss these visualization methods in greater detail.
5 Parameter estimation
The parameters of our share-switching model can be estimated using maximum like-
lihood [ML]. The parameter estimates result from maximization of the log-likelihood
function, which is given by
ln L = −
(T − 1)(J − 1)
2
[
ln(2pi) + ln(σ2)
]
+
1
2
T∑
t=2
log det(V −1t )
−
1
2σ2
T∑
t=2
(M˜t − µt)
′ V −1t (M˜t − µt), (21)
where µt and Vt are defined by (13) and (14), respectively. We note that the inverse
of Vt is given by V
−1
t =
1∑J
l=1
M2
l,t−1
[
M−γJ,t−1 ιJ−1 ι
′
J−1 + diag(M
−γ
1,t−1, . . . ,M
−γ
J−1,t−1)
]
,
see also the Appendix. Standard errors are obtained by taking the square roots
of the diagonal elements of the estimated covariance matrix, which, in turn, can
be computed as minus the inverse of the Hessian of (21) evaluated for the opti-
mal parameter values. Numerical techniques, such as the BFGS algorithm or the
Newton-Raphson algorithm, have to be used to get the ML parameter estimates.
Insert Table 1 about here.
6 Empirical analysis
In this section we apply our model to weekly store-level scanner data, drawn from the
ERIM data base (GSB, University of Chicago) for catsup and peanut butter in the
Sioux Falls SD market (henceforth referred to as market 1) and the Springfield MO
market (henceforth referred to as market 2). The considered period consists of 124
weeks from 1985 to 1988. The last 20 weeks are used for out-of-sample forecasting.
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For each product category, the number of brands is restricted to four by considering
the three largest brands and a “rest brand”. This Rest brand represents several
smaller brands as well as private labels. We allow for marketing-mix effects by
including price and 0/1 display variables. Table 1 contains a few summary statistics.
We note that the prices of the Rest brands have been computed by taking the ratio
of the aggregated sales in dollars and the aggregated sales in units. The market
shares correspond to the number of units sold. It is seen that in general the price
of the Rest brand is lower than the prices of the other three brands. Furthermore,
the table shows that for both catsup and peanut butter the Rest brand has more
displays and a larger market share in the Springfield area than in the Sioux Falls
area.
Insert Table 2 about here.
6.1 Parameter estimates
Table 2 reports the estimates of the response parameters β1 and β2 for price and
display and the two variance parameters σ2 and γ. These parameters are invariant
with respect to the base brand J . For the sake of brevity, we do not report the twelve
intercept parameters αl,k, l = 1, . . . , 4, k = 1, . . . , 3. These intercept parameters are
sensitive to which brand is taken as the base brand (compare with the conditional
logit model), and they are not of particular interest.
The effect of price on market share is significant at a 1% level and has the
expected sign for both catsup and peanut butter in the two markets. Display has a
significant effect (at a 5% level) with the expected sign for the two catsup markets,
but the effect is not significant for the two peanut butter markets. Furthermore,
it is seen that the heteroscedasticity parameter γ is positive and significant for all
four category-market combinations. So, as hypothesized, uncertainty about share-
switching is related to the size of the market share of the receiving brand.
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6.2 Model fit and predictive performance
In order to investigate how well our model performs in terms of in-sample fit and
out-of-sample forecasting, we compare it with two attraction models. The first
competing model is the full effects attraction model in which the attraction of brand
k at time t is defined by
Ak,t = exp
(
αk +
S∑
s=1
J∑
j=1
β(s)j,k ln(x(s)j,t) + εk,t
)
. (22)
Here αk is a brand-specific intercept, x(s)j,t is the value of marketing-mix variable s
for brand j at time t (in our case, s = 1 corresponds to price and s = 2 corresponds
to display), β(s)j,k is the involved response parameter, and εk,t is a disturbance
term. The εk,t are distributed independently as N(0, σ
2
k,t). We note that, in this full
effects specification, the attraction of a brand may be affected by the marketing-mix
variables of each of the considered brands.
Bell, Keeney and Little (1975) show that under certain axioms the market share
of a brand is proportional to its attraction, so that
Mk,t =
Ak,t∑J
i=1 Ai,t
. (23)
The full effects attraction model is given by (22) and (23). We note that in case
the variables x(s)j,t are considered in levels instead of logarithms, the model above
is often referred to as an MNL model for market shares.
The second model we consider is the differential effects specification in which
competition is restricted in the sense that the attraction of a brand is only affected
by its own marketing-mix, that is, β(s)j,k = 0 if j 6= k. The differential effects
attraction model is defined by (23) and
Ak,t = exp
(
αk +
S∑
s=1
β(s)k ln(x(s)k,t) + εk,t
)
. (24)
As our share-switching model is dynamic by definition, we include lagged market
shares in (22) and (24) in the same way as price and display are included. The
literature often considers one common lagged market share parameter for all brands,
see for example Brodie and De Kluyver (1984), Chen, Kanetkar and Weiss (1994),
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Kumar and Heath (1990) and Naert and Weverbergh (1981). However, we find that
this does not improve the predictions.
Finally, for comparability with our share-switching model, we consider the MNL
specifications of the attraction models described above, that is, lagged market share
is in logarithms but price and display are in levels. The impact on in-sample fit and
out-of-sample forecasting turns out to be negligible, and conclusions are unaffected.
Insert Table 3 about here.
We estimate the parameters of the two attraction models by considering a base
brand, as outlined in Fok, Franses and Paap (2002). Next, we generate appropriate
market share predictions using the simulation approach, described in Fok, Franses
and Paap (2002). Table 3 shows the in-sample fit and out-of-sample forecasting
performance of the three considered models. It reports the in-sample and out-of-
sample values for the Root Mean Squared Prediction Error [RMSE] and the Mean
Absolute Prediction Error [MAE].
It is seen from Table 3 that our model has either the best or the second best
in-sample fit. For the Sioux Falls catsup market, the fit of our share-switching model
(containing 16 parameters) is comparable to the fit of the differential effects model
(also containing 16 parameters), but it is worse than the fit of the more flexible full
effects model (containing 43 parameters). Furthermore, the fit of our model is in
between those of the two other models for the Springfield catsup and the Sioux Falls
peanut butter markets. Our model fits the data better than the two attractions
models for the Springfield peanut butter market.
Perhaps more interesting than the in-sample fit is the out-of-sample forecasting
performance of the three models. It is seen that our share-switching model gives
better predictions for three of the four category-market combinations. Our model
is only outperformed by the differential effects model for the Sioux Falls catsup
market.
In sum, for the considered data our model has a reasonable fit and a good fore-
casting performance. This demonstrates that our model has predictive validity. Now
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we have established that our model is equally good, or even better than alternative
models, we can focus on the fact that our model allows for much more managerially
relevant inference.
Insert Table 4 about here.
Insert Table 5 about here.
6.3 Price elasticity analysis
Table 4 and Table 5 contain the estimated market-share price elasticities δk,j,t for
the catsup and peanut butter markets. These elasticities are decomposed into com-
ponents ηl→k,j,t attributable to changes in share-switching from each of the brands l
towards the brand k whose market share is affected when brand j changes its price.
For example, Table 4 indicates that in the Sioux Falls catsup market a one percent
decrease of the price of Heinz can be expected to result in a 2.27% increase of the
own market share because of increased customer retention. Furthermore, additional
switching from Hunts, Del Monte and Rest towards Heinz increases the market share
of Heinz by another 1.10%, 0.77% and 0.30%, respectively. The total gain in market
share is 4.44%. About 50% (≈ 2.27/4.44×100%) is caused by customer retention.
The remaining 50% is attributable to switching from the three competing brands
towards Heinz.
The above example illustrates that the elasticity decompositions, reported in
Table 4 and Table 5, can give interesting insights into which part of the reaction
of the own market share to an own price reduction is caused by increased customer
retention and which part is not. Such insights cannot be obtained from market share
attraction models. For the catsup and peanut butter brands in the Sioux Falls and
Springfield markets, we find that increased customer retention accounts for 28% to
51% of the total increase of the own market share when the own price is lowered.
On average, this is about 42%. So, we find that the majority of the gain in market
share is caused by gaining additional share from competing brands, and not so much
by increasing own customer retention.
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As a second example, we mention that Heinz is expected to lose 2.03% of its
market share in the Sioux Falls market if Hunts decreases its price by one percent.
Here 1.06% of the loss is attributable to switching from Heinz to Hunts, that is,
decreased customer retention of Heinz, and 0.70 is attributable to additional share
retained by Hunts which would have gone to Heinz in case there would not have been
a price reduction. Furthermore, 0.22% is attributable to share of Del Monte going to
Hunts, which would have gone to Heinz otherwise. Finally, 0.05% is attributable to
switching from Rest to Hunts. So, about 50% (≈ 1.06/2.03×100%) of the total effect
of a price reduction of Hunts on the market share of Heinz is caused by decreased
customer retention for Heinz. The remaining 50% is attributable to share-switching
in which Heinz is not directly involved.
For the catsup and peanut butter brands in the Sioux Falls and Springfield mar-
kets, we find that the part of the decrease in own market share when a competitive
brand lowers its price, attributable to decreased own customer retention, is mostly
between 20% and 60% (44 out of 48 cases). On average, this is about 40%. We find
that in most cases (39 out of 48 cases) the majority of the loss in own market share
is caused by share-switching in which the own brand is not directly involved. There
exists substantial variation, though, in particular in the two catsup markets.
6.3.1 Asymmetric price competition
Table 1 shows that for all four category-market combinations the prices of the three
national brands are comparable, whereas the price of the Rest brand is substantially
lower. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that the perceived quality of brands
summarized in the Rest group is also lower than the perceived quality of the national
brands, as otherwise Rest should have an enormous market share. A finding, which
is due to Blattberg and Wisniewski (1989), predicts that price promotions are more
effective for higher-price higher-quality [HPHQ] brands than for lower-price lower-
quality [LPLQ] brands. This means that HPHQ brands can gain more share from
LPLQ brands by offering a price reduction than vice versa. Kamakura and Russell
(1989) and Allenby and Rossi (1991) provide additional empirical support for this
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asymmetric price competition result. Sethuraman, Srinivasan and Kim (1999) make
it an empirical generalization that asymmetric price competition holds in terms of
cross-price elasticities.
The literature offers several explanations for this phenomenon. Blattberg and
Wisniewski (1989) argue that asymmetric price competition can result from a U-
shaped heterogeneity distribution for the quality preferences concerning any two
brands with regular prices such that the indifference point is located towards the
lower quality end of this distribution. This implies that customers of LPLQ brands
are more price sensitive than customers of HPHQ brands. Allenby and Rossi (1991)
propose an alternative explanation that price reductions induce positive income
effects which stimulate switching from low-quality brands to high-quality brands.
They formalize this through rotating utility indifference curves. Hardie, Johnson and
Fader (1993) consider reference effects and loss aversion concerning the prices and
qualities of brands. They explain asymmetric price competition from the notion that
losses in terms of price or quality, incurred by brand-switching, are weighted more
heavily than resulting gains. Bronnenberg and Wathieu (1996) conditionally support
the result of Blattberg and Wisniewski (1989). They state that it holds if and only
if the quality gap between an HPHQ brand and an LPLQ brand is sufficiently
large compared to the price gap. If this condition does not hold, asymmetric price
competition is reversed.
The market-share price elasticities in Table 4 and Table 5 indicate that asym-
metric price competition holds for both catsup and peanut butter in the Sioux Falls
market. For example, in the Sioux Falls peanut butter market, Rest loses 2.12% of
its share when Skippy lowers its price by one percent, whereas this is only 1.18% in
the oppositive case. However, it is also seen from the tables that the asymmetric
price competition effect is sometimes reversed in the Springfield market. For catsup,
a one percent price reduction of Del Monte turns out to be less effective than a one
percent price reduction of the Rest brand. For peanut butter, the asymmetric price
competition effect of Blattberg and Wisniewski (1989) is reversed for Skippy and Jif
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relative to the cheaper Rest brand. The explanation of Bronnenberg and Wathieu
(1996) would be that, in the Springfield market, the perceived difference in qual-
ity between these national brands and the Rest brand is insufficient to account for
the price difference. We note from Table 1 that the price gap between the national
brands and the Rest brand is larger in the Springfield market than in the Sioux Falls
market, and that in the Springfield market the Rest brands also have larger market
shares. This indicates that the Rest brands offer “good value” in the Springfield
market, which is consistent with the Bronnenberg-Wathieu finding.
6.3.2 Price elasticity maps
In order to better understand the underlying patterns of the asymmetric market-
share price elasticities δk,j,t in Table 4 and Table 5, these elasticities can be displayed
in two-dimensional competitive maps, see Cooper (1988, 1993). The main compu-
tational step to deduce such a map from the J × J elasticity matrix ∆ = (δk,j,t)
consists of finding a matrix of rank 2 such that it approximates ∆ as good as pos-
sible. This rank-2 approximation can be written as V C ′, where both V and C are
J × 2 matrices. The matrices V and C can be obtained using the singular value
decomposition, see Golub and Van Loan (1989) and Magnus and Neudecker (1999)
for textbook discussions on this decomposition.2
As the elasticity matrix ∆ is approximated by V C ′, the effect of the price of
brand j on the market share of brand k, that is δk,j,t, is approximated by the inner
product of the k-th row of V and the j-th row of C. If these two rows are displayed
as two vectors from the origin, the inner product (representing the elasticity δk,j,t)
is determined by both the vector lengths and the angle between the two vectors.
The sharpness of the angle can be interpreted as indicating the influence of a price
reduction of brand j on the market share of brand k compared to the influence of this
2The elements of V and C can be computed using the singular value decomposition of ∆, that
is, ∆ = SWU ′, where W is a diagonal matrix containing the singular values of ∆ (the square roots
of the eigenvalues of ∆∆′, or equivalently, the square roots of the eigenvalues of ∆′∆), S contains
the eigenvectors of ∆∆′ such that S′S = IJ , and U contains the eigenvectors of ∆
′∆ such that
U ′U = IJ . Now, we can define V = S˜W˜
1/2 and C = U˜W˜ 1/2, where the submatrices S˜ (J × 2), U˜
(J × 2) and W˜ (2× 2) correspond to the two largest singular values in W .
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price reduction on the other brands. Furthermore, the vector length corresponding
to the k-th row of V indicates the overall extent to which the market share of brand
k is influenced by competitive price reductions, that is, the vulnerability (V ) of
brand k. Similarly, the vector length corresponding to the j-th row of C indicates
the overall ability of brand j to affect the market shares of competitive brands by
lowering the own price, that is, the clout (C) of brand j.
Insert Figure 3 about here.
Figure 3 contains the price elasticity maps for the considered store-level data.
The top-left map indicates that, in the Sioux Falls catsup market, Heinz and Rest
are the most direct price competitors in the sense that they affect each other more
than they affect the other competing brands. On the other hand, price competition
between Del Monte and Rest is relatively weak. The asymmetric price competition
effect, which is present in this market, is illustrated by the large vulnerability of the
Rest brand relative to its clout. The bottom-left map for the Sioux Falls peanut
butter market displays price competition between Skippy and Jif, and price com-
petition between Peter Pan and Rest. However, the asymmetric price competition
effect, which is weaker than in the previous case, is now less evident. The top-right
map in the figure does not give an obvious price competition pattern for the Spring-
field catsup market. However, the limited clout and vulnerability of the Rest brand
might be considered as an indication that “the map is not very convinced about
the position of the Rest brand”. This might be caused by a strong violation of
the asymmetric price competition effect. Finally, also the bottom-right map for the
Springfield peanut butter market does not show a clear price competition pattern.
However, the small clout of the Rest brand and the even much smaller vulnerability
can be seen as an indication that, in this case, the asymmetric price competition
effect of Blattberg and Wisniewski (1989) is mainly, but not entirely, reversed.
Insert Table 6 about here.
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6.4 Share-switching analysis
Our model can be used to analyze share-switching patterns. Also this yields insights
which cannot be obtained from market share attraction models. Table 6 shows the
share-switching estimates, averaged over the in-sample period, for the considered
markets. It reports the row-conditional share-switching fractions λ˜l,k,t and the ab-
solute share-switching portions λ¯l,k,t = Ml,t−1λ˜l,k,t.
A casual inspection of the share-switching fractions λ˜l,k,t in Table 6 indicates that
Heinz has the most loyal customer base in the two catsup markets, whereas Peter
Pan can be regarded as having the most loyal customer base in the two peanut but-
ter markets. Furthermore, it can be seen that, compared to the Sioux Falls market,
customers in the Springfield market are more loyal to the Rest brand, representing
several smaller brands and private labels, than they are loyal to the more expensive
national brands. This holds for both catsup and peanut butter. Finally, the share-
switching portions λ¯l,k,t show some strong asymmetries. For example, in the Sioux
Falls peanut butter market, on average 5.9% of the total market switches from Jif
to Skippy, whereas on average only 3.7% switches from Skippy to Jif. However, for
all brands the average total share coming in (the sum of column elements) and the
average total share going out (the sum of corresponding row elements) are approx-
imately equal. This is a necessary condition for stationarity of market shares. So,
although we find asymmetries in share-switching, our model seems to support the
finding of Lal and Padmanabhan (1995) that market shares are mostly stationary.
6.4.1 Share-switching maps
It is instructive to visualize the share-switching estimates in Table 6, so that switch-
ing patterns can be recognized more easily. In order to do so, we apply the multi-
dimensional unfolding technique of Constantine and Gower (1978). This method is
suitable to display asymmetric share-switching in a two-dimensional map. Alterna-
tively, one might consider the multidimensional scaling methodology of DeSarbo and
Manrai (1992). Their method is based on the distance-density model of Krumhansl
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(1978). Basically, it posits that asymmetries in brand-switching are caused by the
locations of the involved brands on the map, that is, it matters whether a brand is
located in a dense region with many competing brands nearby (little differentiation)
or in a relatively sparse region (much differentiation). In this paper we apply the
technique of Constantine and Gower (1978), and not the methodology of DeSarbo
and Manrai (1992), for two reasons. First, we do not want to restrict ourselves to
the condition that asymmetries in share-switching are only determined by brand
differentiation relative to all competing brands. Second, the method of Constan-
tine and Gower (1978) is more compatible with the price elasticity maps from the
previous subsection.
Similar to the price elasticity maps, we identify a share-switching vulnerability
point and a share-switching clout point for each brand. The vulnerability of brand
l is given by the l-th row of the J × 2 matrix V , that is, Vl,·. Similarly, the clout
of brand k is given by the k-th row of the J × 2 matrix C, that is, Ck,·. The
matrices V and C are constructed such that, for all brands l and k with l 6= k, the
distance between Vl,· and Ck,· in the two-dimensional map represents the amount
of share-switching from brand l to brand k as good as possible. Here a larger
distance between the vulnerability point of brand l and the clout point of brand k
indicates stronger share-switching from l to k. We obtain V and C by minimizing
the sum of squared errors
∑J
l=1
∑
k 6=l (||Vl,· −Ck,·|| − λ¯l,k,t)
2, where λ¯l,k,t = λ¯l,k,t/λ¯l,l,t
are normalized share-switching portions, and || · || denotes the Euclidean norm. We
consider the normalized share-switching portions λ¯l,k,t, instead of λ˜l,k,t or λ¯l,k,t, for
the following reasons. First, the absolute share-switching portions λ¯l,k,t are preferred
over the row-conditional share-switching fractions λ˜l,k,t, as the former account for
variation in the size of the market share of brand l over time. This means that share-
switching, which might be substantial relative to the supplying brand l but which at
that moment is negligible compared to the whole market, is assigned less importance
than share-switching, which is also substantial at the market level. Second, the
normalization from λ¯l,k,t to λ¯l,k,t = λ¯l,k,t/λ¯l,l,t implies that share-switching away
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from brand l is related to the retained share of brand l. This makes the share-
switching measure invariant with respect to the sizes of the various brands. We
note that the normalization of all share-switching portions λ¯l,k,t implies that the
normalized retained portions λ¯l,l,t, which are not considered in the construction of
V and C, all have value one.
Insert Figure 4 about here.
Figure 4 contains the share-switching maps for the considered store-level data.
The top-left map shows that, in the Sioux Falls catsup market, the leading brand
Heinz poses a threat to all other brands. In the opposite direction, Heinz mainly
loses share to Hunts. We further see that substantial share-switching occurs between
Hunts and Del Monte. However, Del Monte suffers more from Hunts than vice versa.
The top-right map displays share-switching in the Springfield catsup market. Similar
to the Sioux Falls market, Heinz gains substantial share from all three competing
brands, while there is little share-switching between Del Monte and Rest. Actually,
the central location of the clout of Del Monte, with the vulnerability points of the
three competing brands nearby, indicates that Del Monte does not gain much share
from any competitor. There is relatively much share-switching between Hunts and
Rest.
Finally, the bottom two maps show a strong asymmetry in share-switching be-
tween Skippy and Peter Pan in the Sioux Falls and Springfield peanut butter mar-
kets. Skippy suffers much more from Peter Pan than vice versa. In both markets,
Peter Pan loses relatively much share to the Rest brand. Share-switching between
Peter Pan and Rest is asymmetric in favor of the Rest brand.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we proposed a model for market shares which can be used to infer
share-switching across brands from store-level scanner data. These insights cannot
be obtained from market share attraction models, although these models could be
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taken as competitors when it comes to out-of-sample forecasting of shares. A second
contribution of our model is that it allows for a decomposition of own and cross price
elasticities into components attributable to changes in share-switching from each of
the brands towards the brand whose market share is affected. This decomposition
can, for example, be used to investigate which part of the reaction of the own market
share to an own price reduction is caused by increased customer retention, and which
part is not.
We illustrated our model for store-level scanner data concerning the catsup and
peanut butter categories in the Sioux Falls SD and Springfield MO markets. For
these data sets, our model performed well compared to the familiar market share
attraction model, both in terms of in-sample fit and out-of-sample forecasting. The
elasticity decompositions from our model showed that the majority of the increased
market share after an own price reduction is caused by gaining additional share
from competing brands, and not so much by increasing own customer retention.
Furthermore, the elasticity decompositions indicated that in most cases the majority
of the loss in own market share after a competitive price reduction is caused by
share-switching in which the own brand is not directly involved, and not so much
by decreased own customer retention.
Next, we investigated whether the resulting price elasticities were consistent
with the finding of Blattberg and Wisniewski (1989) that higher-price higher-quality
brands can gain more share from lower-price lower-quality brands by offering a price
reduction than vice versa. This result was supported for both catsup and peanut
butter in the Sioux Falls market, but it was not supported in the Springfield market.
An explanation for the disparity, which seems consistent with the considered data,
is that in the Springfield market the perceived quality gap between the expensive
national brands and the cheaper Rest brand is not always sufficient to account
for the price difference. This explanation would be in accordance with a result in
Bronnenberg and Wathieu (1996).
Finally, we inferred share-switching across brands from our model. The share-
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switching estimates indicated that Heinz has the most loyal customer base in the
two catsup markets, whereas Peter Pan can be regarded as having the most loyal
customer base in the two peanut butter markets. Although the estimated share-
switching portions showed some strong asymmetries, the resulting market shares
seemed balanced in the sense that for each brand the total share coming in and the
total share going out were approximately equal. By considering two-dimensional
share-switching maps, we discovered some interesting patterns in share-switching.
We found that in both the Sioux Falls and Springfield catsup markets Heinz gains
substantial share from all competing brands, while there is little share competition
between Del Monte and the Rest brand. Furthermore, we found some strong asym-
metries in both markets for peanut butter. Skippy loses much more share to Peter
Pan than vice versa, and Peter Pan loses relatively much share to the Rest brand.
A limitation of our analysis is that it does not account for primary demand ef-
fects, that is, we considered how category sales are distributed across brands, but we
did not consider whether the total market expands or shrinks over time. For exam-
ple, it might well be that absolute sales of a brand decrease while the market share
increases. In this case, the secondary demand effect (larger market share) is domi-
nated by the primary demand effect (smaller total market). Van Heerde, Gupta and
Wittink (2002) put forward a unit sales decomposition for primary and secondary
demand effects that accounts for increased category volume after a price promo-
tion. This decomposition is complementary to the frequently considered primary-
secondary demand elasticity decomposition, which assumes that total category sales
are held constant. By accounting for category expansion effects, Van Heerde, Gupta
and Wittink (2002) find that the primary demand effect is larger than was previously
believed. An interesting extension of our model would therefore be to include non-
purchase behavior in order to account for changes in primary demand. In principle,
this can be done by representing all non-purchases by an “outside good”, which is
just regarded as another brand. Its market share is then modelled together with
the market shares of the considered brands. However, a practical complication of
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this extension is that it requires information on the size of the total market. When
one would have information on unit sales for each brand, the total number of store
visits and the average purchase quantity, it should be possible to obtain the size of
the outside good, see for example Chintagunta (2000).
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Appendix A
The model in Leeflang (1974) amounts to the following. Suppose there are N house-
holds in a market for a product category for which J brands are available. House-
holds have homogeneous preferences and each household purchases precisely one
unit per period. To be more specific, at time t, each household chooses brand k,
k = 1, . . . , J , with probability pk,t, which might depend on the marketing activity
of the brand. Under these assumptions, total unit sales per brand, denoted by Nk,t,
k = 1, . . . , J , are multinomially MN(N, p1,t, . . . , pJ,t) distributed. That is,
Pr(N1,t = n1,t, . . . , NJ,t = nJ,t) =
N !
n1,t! . . . nJ,t!
p
n1,t
1,t . . . p
nJ,t
J,t . (A.1)
It follows from the properties of the multinomial distribution that
E(N1,t, . . . , NJ,t) = (Np1,t, . . . , NpJ,t), (A.2)
Cov(N1,t, . . . , NJ,t) = NΩt, (A.3)
where the (i, j)-th element of Ωt is defined by
ω(i,j),t =


pi,t(1− pi,t) if i = j
− pi,t pj,t if i 6= j
. (A.4)
By definition, the market share of brand k at time t is given by Mk,t = Nk,t/N ,
k = 1, . . . , J , so that it immediately follows from (A.2) and (A.3) that
E(M1,t, . . . ,MJ,t) = (p1,t, . . . , pJ,t), (A.5)
Cov(M1,t, . . . ,MJ,t) =
1
N
Ωt. (A.6)
The brand choice probabilities pk,t, k = 1, . . . , J , are unconditional on the past.
They can be related to the previous period as follows, that is,
pk,t =
J∑
l=1
λ˜l,k,t pl,t−1, (A.7)
where λ˜l,k,t denotes the probability that brand k is chosen given that brand l was
chosen during the previous period. So, λ˜l,k,t is the conditional probability of moving
from brand l to brand k. By replacing the unobserved brand choice probability pk,t
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in (A.7) by the observed market share Mk,t, the relationship still holds, but now
only approximately. Recall that E(Mk,t) = pk,t. One obtains that
Mk,t =
J∑
l=1
λ˜l,k,tMl,t−1 + ek,t, (A.8)
where ek,t is a disturbance term. Now, it follows from (A.6) and (A.8) that
Cov(e1,t, . . . , eJ,t) =
1
N
Vt, (A.9)
where the (i, j)-th element of Vt is defined by
v(i,j),t =


pi,t −
∑J
l=1 λ˜
2
l,i,t pl,t−1 if i = j
−
∑J
l=1 λ˜l,i,t λ˜l,j,t pl,t−1 if i 6= j
. (A.10)
It can further be shown that the disturbances are uncorrelated over time.
The model is completed by specifying the transition probabilities λ˜l,k,t. They are
defined in a linear fashion under the conditions that λ˜l,k,t > 0 and
∑J
k=1 λ˜l,k,t = 1.
At least, the λ˜l,k,t depend on the marketing instruments of brand l and brand k at
time t and time t− 1.
One of the J market share equations is redundant. In the model, the last equa-
tion is simply disregarded in the estimation procedure. Leeflang (1974, p. 134) calls
this “a workable but not very elegant solution”. The estimation method is essen-
tially Feasible Generalized Least Squares [FGLS], where the probabilities pk,t in the
covariance matrix Vt have been replaced by the corresponding market shares Mk,t.
However, as the parameters have to satisfy inequality restrictions, the estimation
procedure involves optimization under inequality restrictions. Furthermore, the co-
variance matrix is not necessarily positive definite, as this depends on the estimated
λ˜l,k,t.
How does the model in Leeflang (1974) differ from the one we propose in this
paper? First, the estimation results are not invariant with respect to which equation
is disregarded. This is contrary to our model. Second, estimation of the parameters
in the Leeflang model is more complicated, as it amounts to optimization under
inequality restrictions, instead of simply maximizing the likelihood. Furthermore,
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positive definiteness of the involved covariance matrix depends on the values of λ˜l,k,t.
We note that our model accounts for the inequality restrictions through the func-
tional form, and that in our model the covariance matrix is positive definite by
construction. Third, both the Leeflang model and our model imply a negative cor-
relation between market shares. This makes sense. However, in the Leeflang model
this negative correlation originates from the second moment of the multinomial dis-
tribution, whereas in our model it originates from accounting for the “redistribution
condition” that
∑J
k=1 λ˜l,k,t = 1. Finally, we note that in our model λ˜l,k,t is only
influenced by the marketing instruments of the receiving brand k, and not by the
marketing instruments of the supplying brand l. This is in accordance with the
brand-switching models of Givon (1984) and Seetharaman and Chintagunta (1998).
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Appendix B
In this Appendix we derive the distribution of the market shares Mt = Λ˜
′
tMt−1 +
E ′tMt−1 after imposing the restrictions
∑J
k=1 el,k,t = 0, l = 1, . . . , J on the error
matrix Et. Before imposing these restrictions, the share-switching errors el,k,t are
independently N(0, σ2k,t) distributed with σ
2
k,t = σ
2Mγk,t−1.
We first derive the distribution of (el,1,t, . . . , el,J,t)
′, given
∑J
k=1 el,k,t = 0, l =
1, . . . , J . Without imposing the summation restriction, the density of (el,1,t, . . . , el,J,t)
′
is given by
f(el,1,t, . . . , el,J,t) ∝ exp
(
−
1
2
J∑
k=1
e2l,k,t
σ2k,t
)
, (B.1)
where ∝ denotes “is proportional to”. In order to impose that
∑J
k=1 el,k,t = 0, we
make a transformation of variables from (el,1,t, . . . , el,J−1,t, el,J,t)
′ to (el,1,t, . . . , el,J−1,t, z)
′
with z =
∑J
k=1 el,k,t. Note that el,J,t = z −
∑J−1
k=1 el,k,t. As the Jacobian matrix of
this transformation has determinant one, the transformed density becomes
f(el,1,t, . . . , el,J−1,t, z) ∝ exp
(
−
1
2
[
J−1∑
k=1
e2l,k,t
σ2k,t
+
(z −
∑J−1
k=1 el,k,t)
2
σ2J,t
])
. (B.2)
Now, imposing the restriction z =
∑J
k=1 el,k,t = 0 gives
f(el,1,t, . . . , el,J−1,t, 0) ∝ exp
(
−
1
2
[
J−1∑
k=1
e2l,k,t
σ2k,t
+
(
∑J−1
k=1 el,k,t)
2
σ2J,t
])
= exp
(
−
1
2
e˜′l,t Γt e˜l,t
)
(B.3)
with e˜l,t = (el,1,t, . . . , el,J−1,t)
′ and Γt =
1
σ2
J,t
ιJ−1 ι
′
J−1+diag(
1
σ2
1,t
, . . . , 1
σ2
J−1,t
), where the
diag operator transforms a vector into a diagonal matrix with the vector elements
on the diagonal. It follows from (B.3) that (el,1,t, . . . , el,J−1,t)
′ ∼ N(0, Ωt) with
Ωt = Γ
−1
t
= −
1∑J
j=1 σ
2
j,t


σ21,t
...
σ2J−1,t


(
σ21,t · · · σ
2
J−1,t
)
+ diag
(
σ21,t, . . . , σ
2
J−1,t
)
, (B.4)
l = 1, . . . , J . We note that it is easily verified that ΩtΓt = IJ−1, the (J−1)× (J−1)
identity matrix, so that Ωt is indeed the inverse of Γt. By substituting σ
2
k,t =
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σ2Mγk,t−1 into (B.4), it is obtained that
Ωt = σ
2
−
1∑J
j=1 M
γ
j,t−1


Mγ1,t−1
...
MγJ−1,t−1


(
Mγ1,t−1 · · ·M
γ
J−1,t−1
)
+ diag
(
Mγ1,t−1, . . . ,M
γ
J−1,t−1
)

 .
(B.5)
Finally, as Mt = Λ˜
′
tMt−1 + E
′
tMt−1, so that


M1,t
...
MJ−1,t

 =
J∑
l=1
Ml,t−1


λ˜l,1,t
...
λ˜l,J−1,t

+
J∑
l=1
Ml,t−1


el,1,t
...
el,J−1,t

 , (B.6)
and (el,1,t, · · · , el,J−1,t)
′, l = 1 . . . , J , are independently distributed, it follows that
M˜t =


M1,t
...
MJ−1,t

 ∼ N( µt, σ
2Vt ), (B.7)
where
µt =


∑J
l=1 λ˜l,1,tMl,t−1
...
∑J
l=1 λ˜l,J−1,tMl,t−1

 , (B.8)
and
Vt =
J∑
l=1
M2l,t−1

−
1∑J
j=1 M
γ
j,t−1


Mγ1,t−1
...
MγJ−1,t−1


(
Mγ1,t−1 · · ·M
γ
J−1,t−1
)
+ diag
(
Mγ1,t−1, . . . ,M
γ
J−1,t−1
)

 .
(B.9)
We note that by analogy with Ωt = Γ
−1
t , the inverse of Vt is given by V
−1
t =
1∑J
l=1
M2
l,t−1
[
M−γJ,t−1 ιJ−1 ι
′
J−1 + diag(M
−γ
1,t−1, . . . ,M
−γ
J−1,t−1)
]
.
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Table 1: A summary of the data, that is, the average values and the standard devi-
ations (given in parentheses) of the market shares, prices and 0/1 display variables.
mshare price display
catsup 1
Heinz 0.51 (0.22) 1.16 (0.10) 0.41 (0.49)
Hunts 0.26 (0.19) 1.09 (0.09) 0.54 (0.50)
Del Monte 0.17 (0.16) 1.09 (0.09) 0.40 (0.49)
Rest 0.07 (0.08) 0.87 (0.05) 0.09 (0.28)
catsup 2
Heinz 0.37 (0.16) 1.34 (0.07) 0.68 (0.47)
Hunts 0.22 (0.14) 1.34 (0.11) 0.75 (0.43)
Del Monte 0.10 (0.09) 1.37 (0.09) 0.56 (0.50)
Rest 0.30 (0.11) 0.84 (0.07) 0.88 (0.33)
pbutter 1
Skippy 0.31 (0.19) 1.68 (0.12) 0.39 (0.49)
Jif 0.25 (0.13) 1.72 (0.11) 0.17 (0.38)
Peter Pan 0.25 (0.16) 1.68 (0.16) 0.35 (0.48)
Rest 0.19 (0.11) 1.36 (0.12) 0.19 (0.39)
pbutter 2
Skippy 0.10 (0.06) 1.78 (0.21) 0.10 (0.31)
Jif 0.16 (0.07) 1.81 (0.20) 0.10 (0.30)
Peter Pan 0.36 (0.16) 1.70 (0.25) 0.67 (0.47)
Rest 0.37 (0.13) 1.23 (0.13) 0.66 (0.47)
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Table 2: Estimates of the marketing-mix response parameters and the variance
parameters. The estimated standard errors are given in parentheses.
catsup 1 catsup 2 pbutter 1 pbutter 2
β1 (price) −0.860
∗∗∗ −1.099∗∗∗ −0.686∗∗∗ −0.406∗∗∗
(0.110) (0.145) (0.079) (0.040)
β2 (display) 0.452
∗∗∗ 0.383∗∗ −0.046 0.129
(0.108) (0.166) (0.148) (0.108)
σ2 0.291∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗
(0.058) (0.040) (0.026) (0.022)
γ 0.870∗∗∗ 1.043∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗ 0.987∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.115) (0.145) (0.111)
** significant at 5%.
*** significant at 1%.
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Table 3: In-sample fit and out-of-sample forecasting performance.
catsup 1 catsup 2 pbutter 1 pbutter 2
in-sample
RMSE our model 0.142 0.098 0.116 0.078
full effects 0.132 0.094 0.104 0.090
diff. effects 0.143 0.103 0.123 0.111
MAE our model 0.101 0.069 0.083 0.055
full effects 0.092 0.068 0.075 0.064
diff. effects 0.099 0.076 0.090 0.078
out-of-sample
RMSE our model 0.147 0.103 0.120 0.084
full effects 0.162 0.119 0.146 0.111
diff. effects 0.139 0.116 0.160 0.213
MAE our model 0.105 0.083 0.098 0.062
full effects 0.114 0.087 0.112 0.075
diff. effects 0.099 0.089 0.127 0.154
39
Table 4: Estimated market-share price elasticities δk,j,t for the two catsup markets,
decomposed into components ηl→k,j,t attributable to each of the supplying brands.
The reported values amount to averages over time. The index j indicates the brand
whose price is changed, the index k indicates the brand whose market share is af-
fected, and the index l indicates the supplying brand in the elasticity decomposition
(1 = Heinz, 2 = Hunts, 3 = Del Monte, 4 = Rest). The market-share price elastici-
ties are written in bold.
catsup 1 catsup 2
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4
j = 1
l = 1 −2.27 2.10 2.30 2.12 −2.00 1.29 1.56 1.05
l = 2 −1.10 1.57 0.62 0.78 −0.92 1.32 0.39 0.21
l = 3 −0.77 0.46 1.46 0.20 −0.49 0.12 1.77 0.00
l = 4 −0.30 0.12 0.00 2.02 −0.71 0.14 0.12 0.94
−4.44 4.25 4.38 5.13 −4.13 2.86 3.84 2.21
j = 2
l = 1 1.06 −2.53 0.63 0.58 0.82 −1.57 0.22 0.17
l = 2 0.70 −2.30 0.84 1.09 0.69 −3.10 1.45 0.84
l = 3 0.22 −1.00 0.79 0.11 0.07 −0.51 0.96 0.00
l = 4 0.05 −0.19 0.00 0.30 0.08 −1.46 0.12 1.05
2.03 −6.03 2.27 2.09 1.65 −6.63 2.76 2.07
j = 3
l = 1 0.77 0.42 −2.95 0.41 0.25 0.06 −2.10 0.05
l = 2 0.19 0.58 −1.53 0.28 0.07 0.45 −2.24 0.07
l = 3 0.46 0.56 −2.24 0.23 0.43 0.39 −2.97 0.01
l = 4 0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00 0.02 0.03 −1.14 0.20
1.42 1.55 −6.73 0.91 0.77 0.93 −8.45 0.32
j = 4
l = 1 0.18 0.10 0.10 −2.38 0.55 0.13 0.13 −0.80
l = 2 0.06 0.20 0.07 −1.69 0.09 0.79 0.17 −0.73
l = 3 0.01 0.02 0.05 −0.43 0.00 0.00 0.02 −0.01
l = 4 0.18 0.06 0.00 −1.74 0.39 0.80 0.53 −1.45
0.43 0.36 0.23 −6.24 1.05 1.72 0.85 −2.99
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Table 5: Estimated market-share price elasticities δk,j,t for the two peanut butter
markets, decomposed into components ηl→k,j,t attributable to each of the supplying
brands. The reported values amount to averages over time. The index j indicates
the brand whose price is changed, the index k indicates the brand whose market
share is affected, and the index l indicates the supplying brand in the elasticity
decomposition (1 = Skippy, 2 = Jif, 3 = Peter Pan, 4 = Rest). The market-share
price elasticities are written in bold.
pbutter 1 pbutter 2
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 4
j = 1
l = 1 −2.48 0.99 1.07 0.79 −1.61 0.31 0.20 0.10
l = 2 −1.87 1.53 0.28 0.23 −0.82 0.29 0.06 0.03
l = 3 −0.51 0.08 0.29 0.09 −0.86 0.05 0.15 0.05
l = 4 −1.04 0.19 0.13 1.01 −1.21 0.08 0.04 0.25
−5.90 2.79 1.78 2.12 −4.49 0.72 0.45 0.43
j = 2
l = 1 0.90 −1.49 0.26 0.20 0.52 −0.47 0.04 0.02
l = 2 1.48 −2.86 0.71 0.55 0.51 −1.71 0.42 0.20
l = 3 0.10 −1.30 0.99 0.34 0.09 −1.04 0.37 0.12
l = 4 0.21 −1.00 0.15 1.02 0.14 −1.23 0.09 0.49
2.69 −6.65 2.11 2.12 1.25 −4.44 0.93 0.83
j = 3
l = 1 0.98 0.28 −1.50 0.24 0.65 0.09 −0.26 0.03
l = 2 0.26 0.73 −1.04 0.11 0.19 0.84 −0.54 0.08
l = 3 0.30 0.90 −2.30 1.21 0.53 0.69 −1.34 0.74
l = 4 0.13 0.13 −0.73 0.71 0.16 0.17 −0.64 0.58
1.67 2.04 −5.58 2.28 1.53 1.79 −2.79 1.42
j = 4
l = 1 0.42 0.13 0.14 −0.99 0.25 0.03 0.02 −0.11
l = 2 0.12 0.35 0.07 −0.70 0.07 0.31 0.06 −0.22
l = 3 0.08 0.21 0.79 −1.32 0.14 0.17 0.59 −0.67
l = 4 0.56 0.52 0.37 −2.24 0.62 0.66 0.38 −1.00
1.18 1.20 1.36 −5.25 1.08 1.18 1.05 −1.99
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Table 6: Share-switching estimates, that is, the row-conditional share-switching
fractions λ˜l,k,t from brand l to brand k and the absolute share-switching portions
λ¯l,k,t = Ml,t−1λ˜l,k,t from brand l to brand k. The reported values amount to averages
over time.
k k
share-switching fractions share-switching portions
catsup 1
Heinz 0.692 0.157 0.116 0.035 0.333 0.086 0.063 0.018
l Hunts 0.270 0.567 0.113 0.049 0.079 0.134 0.033 0.013
Del Monte 0.277 0.174 0.533 0.015 0.056 0.035 0.083 0.003
Rest 0.518 0.087 0.000 0.396 0.034 0.005 0.000 0.025
catsup 2
Heinz 0.849 0.063 0.019 0.069 0.318 0.029 0.009 0.031
l Hunts 0.112 0.739 0.038 0.111 0.033 0.163 0.010 0.027
Del Monte 0.183 0.098 0.716 0.003 0.017 0.009 0.058 0.000
Rest 0.078 0.086 0.016 0.821 0.023 0.027 0.005 0.243
pbutter 1
Skippy 0.677 0.117 0.136 0.070 0.185 0.037 0.044 0.025
l Jif 0.211 0.626 0.102 0.062 0.059 0.154 0.029 0.017
Peter Pan 0.035 0.119 0.719 0.127 0.010 0.037 0.175 0.038
Rest 0.135 0.134 0.095 0.637 0.029 0.030 0.019 0.113
pbutter 2
Skippy 0.605 0.131 0.175 0.090 0.060 0.013 0.019 0.009
l Jif 0.074 0.592 0.224 0.110 0.013 0.097 0.041 0.019
Peter Pan 0.029 0.068 0.745 0.158 0.012 0.029 0.263 0.066
Rest 0.047 0.090 0.113 0.750 0.018 0.034 0.044 0.264
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Figure 1: A numerical example of share-switching.
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Figure 2: Illustration of share-switching for multiple periods.
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Figure 3: Price elasticity maps for the catsup and peanut butter categories in the
Sioux Falls SD market and the Springfield MO market.
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Figure 4: Share-switching maps for the catsup and peanut butter categories in the
Sioux Falls SD market and the Springfield MO market.
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